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Overcoming the rate-distance barrier of quantum key
distribution without using quantum repeaters
M. Lucamarini1, Z. L. Yuan1, J. F. Dynes1, and A. J. Shields1
1Toshiba Research Europe Ltd, 208 Cambridge Science Park, Cambridge CB4 0GZ, United Kingdom
Quantum key distribution (QKD)1,2 allows two
distant parties to share encryption keys with
security based on physical laws. Experimen-
tally, it has been implemented with optical
means, achieving key rates of 1.26 Megabit/s
over 50 kilometres (km) of standard optical fi-
bre3 and 1.16 bit/hour over 404 km of ultralow-
loss fibre in a measurement-device-independent
configuration.4 Increasing the bit rate and
range of QKD is a formidable, but important,
challenge. A related target, currently consid-
ered unfeasible without quantum repeaters,5–7
is overcoming the fundamental rate-distance
limit of point-to-point QKD.8,9 Here we intro-
duce a conceptually new scheme where pairs of
phase-randomised optical fields are first gener-
ated at two distant locations and then combined
at a central measuring station. The fields im-
parted with the same random phase are “twins”
and can be employed to distill a quantum key,
as we prove under an explicit security assump-
tion. The key rate of this twin-field QKD (TF-
QKD) shows the same dependence on distance
as a quantum repeater, scaling with the square-
root of the channel transmittance irrespective
of whom is in control of the measuring station.
Differently from a quantum repeater, however,
the new scheme is feasible with current tech-
nology and presents manageable levels of noise
even on 550 km of standard optical fibre. This is
promising to overcome the QKD rate-distance
barrier and to greatly extend the range of se-
cure quantum communications.
To introduce the new scheme, we plot in Fig. 1a a
number of conceptual bounds for the key rate-versus-
distance dependence of QKD, under ideal experimental
conditions (see parameters in the inset). Lines a − d
represent key rates of quantum schemes obtained with-
out resorting to a quantum repeater,5–7 hence they are
denoted “repeater-less bounds”. Line d, in particular,
is the secret key capacity (SKC) of an optical quantum
channel with losses,9 which quantifies the maximum se-
cret information that can be transmitted in QKD.8 On
the experimental side, the key rates currently achieved
are represented by the red symbols. They show a simi-
lar dependence on distance to the repeater-less bounds,
but with lower rates, due to source and detector losses
and other experimental imperfections. This highlights
a limitation of existing QKD schemes, i.e., they can
never surpass the SKC bound.
With the aid of a quantum repeater,5–7 it would be
possible to overcome this barrier. Despite recent ad-
vances,10–13 however, such a device still remains diffi-
cult to realise. One of the simplest versions, tailored for
intercity distances,13 avoids using quantum memories
and quantum error correction, but still requires non-
demolition measurements, conditional optical switches
and the multiplexing of a large number of single photon
sources, all of which is far from trivial to implement.
As a result, there is yet to be an experimental reali-
sation of a scheme that surpasses the SKC barrier. It
is worth mentioning that although a trusted-node net-
work14 and the use of satellites15 can greatly extend
the reach of quantum communications, they do not ex-
ceed the SKC barrier. In the former case, the informa-
tion ceases to be quantum at each intermediate node.
For the latter, outer space provides a low-loss propa-
gation medium, but the key rate per loss unit remains
unchanged.
On the other hand, the scheme presented here can
overcome the point-to-point SKC.9 We anticipate the
TF-QKD key rates in Fig. 1a (thick lines). As shown in
the figure, the ideal TF-QKD (dashed line) overcomes
the repeater-less bounds after 200 km of standard opti-
cal fibre (lighter pink-shaded area). Even when realis-
tic parameters are considered (solid line), TF-QKD can
surpass the ideal repeater-less bound after 340 km of
optical fibre (darker pink-shaded area). The gradient
of the TF-QKD rates resembles that of a single quan-
tum repeater connecting two end points,16 also plot-
ted in the figure. While conventional QKD’s key rate
scales linearly with the channel transmittance η when
η ≪ 1, TF-QKD’s one scales with ∼ η1/2, thus dramat-
ically improving the key rate-distance figure. Although
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a rigorous proof of unconditional security is beyond
the scope of the current paper, this change in the loss
dependence constitutes a fundamental advance in the
long standing QKD paradigm.
In TF-QKD, dim optical pulses are generated by two
light sources, phase-encoded with secret bits and sent
to interfere17 on the beam splitter of an intermediate
station, Charlie, who can even be a malicious party.
Depending on which detector clicks, Charlie can infer
whether the secret bits of the users (Alice and Bob) are
equal (00 or 11) or different (01 or 10), but he cannot
learn their absolute values (0 or 1). This feature guards
the scheme against eavesdropping, in a similar man-
ner to phase-based measurement-device-independent
(MDI)-QKD.18,19 However, TF-QKD also employs
phase randomisation and decoy states20–22 to consid-
erably extend the distance of secure quantum commu-
nications. This, in turn, resembles decoy-state MDI-
QKD23. There, the users send two photons, one each,
to the central station to cause a two-photon interfer-
ence followed by a coincidence count in Charlie’s de-
tectors. In TF-QKD, on the other hand, they send
two optical fields, to produce a single-photon interfer-
ence followed by a single-photon detection event. This
lets TF-QKD retain the MDI characteristic, while gain-
ing the square-root dependance of the key rate on the
channel transmittance. Moreover, this provides an ad-
vantage over MDI-QKD even at short distances when
Charlie’s detectors have low efficiency.
As depicted in Fig. 1b, TF-QKD adopts the same
components as decoy-state MDI-QKD, hence it can be
implemented readily. However, it requires the coor-
dinated phase randomisation of the twin fields. This
is initially performed by Alice and Bob independently
of each other, picking values ρa (Alice) and ρb (Bob)
at random in the semi-open interval [0, 2π), similar to
what has been suggested for the error correction rou-
tine of MDI-QKD.24 The phase interval is split into M
phase slices ∆k = 2πk/M , k = {0, ...,M − 1} (see ex-
ample in Fig. 1c) from which partial phase slices ∆k(a)
and ∆k(b) are defined for Alice and Bob, respectively.
The phase values randomly picked by the users neces-
sarily fall in one of the phase slices. To identify the
twin fields, the users publicly reveal ∆k(a,b) together
with the preparation bases. They keep only the runs
with matching values and discard all the others. This
entails that ρa and ρb will always differ by less than
2π/M for a pair of twin fields and there will be an in-
trinsic quantum bit error rate (QBER) EM due to the
twins being close but not exactly identical. On average,
it will be
EM =
M
2π
∫ 2π/M
0
dt sin2
t
2
=
1
2
− sin(2π/M)
4π/M
. (1)
This QBER tends to zero for M → ∞. However, the
probability of matching two phase slices scales with
1/M . As a consequence there exists an optimal M that
guarantees the best performance. We run a realistic
simulation to maximise the darker pink-shaded area in
Fig. 1a and obtained the optimal value Mopt = 16, in
correspondence of which EMopt = 1.275%.
In Fig. 2 we relate the new scheme to conven-
tional QKD. We first represent the typical interferom-
eter for a phase-encoded QKD setup (Fig. 2a). The
light source generates a coherent state |eiρ√µ〉, with
µ the intensity and ρ the electromagnetic phase car-
rying the so-called “global phase information”. The
phase ρ is uniformly random and the actual state av-
eraged over repeated runs is
∫ 2π
0
dρ
2π |eiρ
√
µ〉〈eiρ√µ| =
∑∞
n=0 pn|µ|n〉〈n|, where pn|µ = e−µµn/n! is the (Pois-
son) probability to emit n photons when a state with
intensity µ was prepared. When the tagging argu-
ment25 is applied to the efficient BB84 protocol26 en-
dowed with decoy states, the QKD key rate in the
asymptotic scenario is given by22
RQKD(µ,L) = Q1
∣
∣
∣
µ,L
[
1− h
(
e1|µ,L
)]
−fQµ,Lh(Eµ,L).
(2)
In Eq. (2), we have explicitly written, for later conve-
nience, the dependence on the total intensity µ and on
the distance L between Alice and Bob. Q
1
= p1|µy1
is the lower bound for the single-photon gain; y
1
and
e1 are, respectively, the lower bound for the single-
photon yield and the upper bound for the single-photon
phase error rate, estimated through the decoy-state
technique; Q and E are the gain and the QBER mea-
sured in the QKD session; f accounts for the efficiency
of error correction and h is the binary entropy.
As an intermediate step to the new scheme, the QKD
interferometer of Fig. 2a has been unfolded in Fig. 2b,
where the two pulses travel now on separate channels
and are separately encoded with the same phase ρ.
These are the twin fields that will interfere on Char-
lie’s beam splitter. The emitted state is unchanged
from the previous scheme, as is the disclosed classical
information, so the two schemes are equivalent.
In Fig. 2c we present the TF-QKD scheme. The de-
tectors have been outsourced to Charlie and the users’
stations have been separated, so that Bob’s station is
now located at distance 2L from Alice. The users’
lasers emit optical pulses that interfere17 on Charlie’s
beam splitter. The pulses are encoded with random
phases ρa,b, which will then be revealed to a finite pre-
cision through the public announcement of the phase
slices ∆k(a,b). We notice that this is different from con-
ventional QKD, where the value of the global phase is
never revealed.
The key feature of TF-QKD is the doubling of the
2
distance between Alice and Bob. As it can be seen
from Fig. 2, the red and blue pulses travel a distance
L each, both in QKD and in TF-QKD. However, while
in QKD they co-propagate from Alice to Bob, in TF-
QKD they run from Alice and Bob towards Charlie,
thus effectively increasing the transmission distance.
In the SI, we show that if revealing the global phase
ρ after Charlie’s measurement did not contribute to
the eavesdropper’s information, the TF-QKD key rate
could be expressed through Eq. (2), as
R
(¬ρ)
TF-QKD(µ,L) =
d
M
[
RQKD
(
µ,
L
2
)]
⊕EM
. (3)
However, the public disclosure of ρ, even after Charlie’s
measurement, can leak information to the eavesdropper
(Eve). In the SI, we consider a specific attack built on
this leakage and show that the resulting key rate still
overcomes the SKC at long distance. Despite that, we
stress that Eq. (3) does not cover the most general
attack by Eve and that the analysis of general attacks
is an outstanding challenge.
The notation ⊕EM in Eq. (3) prompts the in-
trinsic QBER of TF-QKD, EM , due to its phase-
randomisation. The total intensity of the optical pulses
is µ = µa +µb, with µa (µb) the intensity of the pulses
emitted by Alice (Bob). The coefficient 1/M stems
from sifting the phase slices whereas d is the duty cy-
cle between the classical and the quantum modalities,
described later on. Eq. (3) makes it apparent that a
distance L/2 in QKD corresponds to a distance L in
TF-QKD.
The main technical challenge in implementing TF-
QKD is controlling the phase evolution of the twin
fields, which travel hundreds of kilometres before in-
terfering on Charlie’s beam splitter. The differential
phase fluctuation between the two optical paths link-
ing the users to Charlie can be written as
δba =
2π
s
(∆νL+ ν∆L), (4)
where s is the speed of light in the fibre. The first
term arises from the frequency difference ∆ν of the
users’ lasers and can be easily compensated using
phase-locking techniques27 routinely employed in op-
tical communications.28 With a feasible value ∆ν <
1 Hz,29 the phase uncertainty would be ∼ 0.01 rad over
300 km of fibre, negligibly contributing to the QBER.
The second term represents a more serious impairment.
During the propagation in the very long fibres, the twin
fields travel different paths, so their relative phase will
vary. The phase drift of a fibre-based Mach-Zehnder
interferometer with 36.5 km-long arms was previously
characterised to be around 0.3− 1 rad/ms.30
To determine the phase drift over much longer fibres,
we used the experimental setup shown in Fig. 3a. The
presence of a single laser assures that ∆ν = 0 in Eq. (4),
thus letting us measure only the noise due to the fluc-
tuations in the channel. The measured phase drift rate
follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
standard deviation equal to 2.4 rad/ms at a total dis-
tance of 100 km and 6.0 rad/ms at the longest distance
of 550 km (Figs. 3b and 3c). Compensating the phase
drift would require bright pulses and active feedback,
to be realised by Charlie acting on his phase modu-
lator (details in SI). Fig. 3b also shows the visibility
measured as a function of the fibre length. The visibil-
ity remains > 99.65% for all distances, thus causing a
negligible 0.175% contribution to the QBER due to a
loss of coherence along the fibre.
Our findings suggest that the point-to-point secret
key capacity of a quantum channel can be overcome
without using quantum repeaters, with a scheme that
borrows components and techniques from ordinary
QKD. This is not at variance with existing results,8,9
as TF-QKD is not point-to-point. Moreover, it ex-
ploits an assumption that is not present in the secret
key capacity bounds. As in MDI-QKD, the security
of TF-QKD does not depend on the measurement de-
vices. At the same time, its single-photon nature en-
tails count and error rates similar to standard QKD.
Further work is necessary to prove the unconditional
security of TF-QKD, which is an important open ques-
tion left for future investigation. We expect that the
counter-intuitive features of the new scheme will stim-
ulate further research extending the limits of QKD.
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Figure 1: Scheme to overcome the rate-distance limit of QKD. a, Theoretical bounds (lines) and exper-
imental results (symbols) for fibre-based quantum schemes (details in SI). To make a homogeneous comparison,
all the distances have been normalised to the length L of a standard optical fibre with attenuation coefficient
α = 0.2 dB/km. Letter-code for the theoretical bounds are: a, decoy-state MDI-QKD; b, decoy-state QKD;
c, single-photon QKD; d, secret key capacity.9 The single-repeater bound is from Ref. [16]. Symbol-code for
the experimental results: squares, triangles and circles are for QKD, continuous-variable QKD and MDI-QKD,
respectively. TF-QKD is the scheme described in this work. The solid (dashed) line is for the realistic (ideal)
TF-QKD key rate given in Eq. (3). Inset: Parameters used for numerical simulations. Pdc, dark count proba-
bility; ηdet, total detection efficiency; eopt, channel optical error rate; f , error correction coefficient. b, Setup to
implement TF-QKD. The light sources (LS) generate pulses whose intensities µa,b are randomly varied by the
intensity modulators (IM) to implement the decoy-state technique.20–22 Phase modulators (PM) are combined
with random number generators (RNG) to encode each light pulse with phases ϕa,b, which include the random
phases ρa,b. The variable optical attenuators (VOA) set the average output intensity of the pulses to bright
(classical regime) or dim (quantum regime). c, Discretisation of the phase space to identify the twin fields
during the public discussion.
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Figure 3: Experimental characterisation of phase drift and visibility. a, Experimental setup. A light
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10 dBm is used to monitor the phase drift. b, Maximum visibility obtained in the experiment (blue) and phase
drift rate (red) as function of distance. The dashed line represents a qualitative fit that assumes a random walk
model for the phase drift. c, Measured phase drift (top, black) and related phase drift rate (bottom, red) in the
longest-distance configuration of 550 km, obtained with two fibre spools of length 275 km each. The maximum
visibility observed at this specific distance is 99.65%.
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